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Abstract Employment in Vietnam and elsewhere in Asia has grown more slowly than GDP over the last
several decades. This means GDP per capita is rising. Vietnamese policymakers, however, are concerned that
ongoing structural transformation is creating too few jobs. We use data for seven aggregated sectors and the
overall Vietnamese economy to examine the roles played by structural transformation, technical change and
institutional bias towards capital-intensive development to evaluate the Vietnamese development experience.
We ﬁnd that while some of the difference between GDP and employment growth can be attributed to capital-
intensive investment by the state, the majority of the difference is because of technical change. A positive
rather than pessimistic overall assessment is warranted based on the available evidence.
L’emploi au Vietnam et ailleurs en Asie a augmenté plus lentement que le PIB au cours des deux dernières
décennies. Même si cela signiﬁe que le PIB par habitant est en hausse, les décideurs vietnamiens craignent que
la transformation structurelle en cours ne se traduise pas par une croissance de l’emploi assez rapide ni par
sufﬁsamment d’emplois de haute qualité. Alors qu’une partie de la différence avec la croissance du PIB peut
être attribuée à l’investissement à forte intensité de capital effectué par l’Etat, la majorité de la différence se
trouve être en raison de l’évolution technique lorsque l’on prend en compte de faibles élasticités de
substitution, et de la main-d’œuvre qui augmente la partialité dans les changements techniques. Nous utilisons
les données venant de sept secteurs agrégés et de l’économie vietnamienne dans sa totalité pour examiner les
rôles joués par la transformation structurelle, le changement technique et la partialité institutionnelle envers le
développement à forte intensité de capital, aﬁn d’expliquer et d’évaluer l’expérience vietnamienne.
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Introduction
Between 2000 and 2011 GDP grew on average by 6.9 per cent per year in Vietnam, while
employment increased at only 2.7 per cent per year. Two perspectives can be taken on these
outcomes. On the one hand, employment has been growing faster than population, and even
faster GDP growth allows for increasing per capita income. McCaig and Pavcnik (2013) argue
that this is a case of successful development. On the other hand, prominent Vietnamese
policymakers are concerned that employment growth has been too modest, and that slow
employment generation, particularly in the modern sectors, causes slower wage growth, creation
of too few high-quality jobs and serious underemployment problems, especially in rural areas.
A study by Vietnam’s labour ministry done with the ILO argues this case, and asserts that prob-
lems of employment generation are likely to increase in the future (MOLISA and ILO, 2010).
European Journal of Development Research (2017) 29, 54–72. doi:10.1057/ejdr.2015.64; 
published online 29 October 2015 
© 2016 European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes 0957-8811
European Journal of Development Research Vol. 29, 1, 54–72
55 
Structural Transformation
The authors of that report largely attribute ‘slow employment growth’ to inadequate structural
transformation. They repeat the common though controversial argument that the Asian miracle as
implemented in Vietnam is based on heavy capital investment with no technical change (for
example, Kim and Lau, 1994; Krugman, 1994; Young, 1995; Collins and Bosworth, 1996). They
raise the concern that development in Vietnam may have been excessively capital intensive, a
characteristic particularly pronounced in investments made by state-owned and foreign-invested
enterprises. High and growing minimum wages may in this line of thinking have fostered capital-
intensive growth, working against Vietnam’s comparative advantage as a labour-abundant, low-
wage economy. The MOLISA/ILO (2010) study concludes that the investment structure and
labour policies must be adjusted so that high value-added industries, and particularly private
ﬁrms, can be better positioned to create more jobs.
We rely on data for seven aggregate sectors and the overall Vietnamese economy from 2000 to
2011 provided by GSO (2014) to examine the differences observed between employment and
GDP growth. A decomposition framework is used to explore three hypotheses that might explain
employment growth in Vietnam: (i) structural transformation; (ii) technological progress and
(iii) excessively capital-intensive development. Two institutional biases that facilitate capital-
intensive development are studied: (a) minimum wage policy that may distort the wage-rental
ratio and (b) state as well as foreign investment that may be overly capital intensive. Our results
show that only about one-third of the difference in employment and GDP growth is because of
shifts from low- to higher-productivity sectors. The remaining two-thirds come from declining
labour use per unit output that is also found in agriculture. Labour-augmenting technical change1
is an important factor behind Vietnam’s successful growth, and restructuring from capital-
intensive state-owned enterprises is best seen as a missed opportunity, given very small changes
in the state’s employment share.
The next section explores further the context shaping ongoing debates on labour policy in
Vietnam. The section after that reports our decomposition of employment growth, while the
following section considers the impacts of biased technological change on employment. The
penultimate section examines institutional biases – minimum wage policy and investment biases
– that might inﬂuence employment growth. The ﬁnal section concludes.
Context and Background
Three issues are examined here that relate to Vietnam’s recent structural transformation and
employment growth. First, Vietnam’s recent economic history is explored. Next, its performance
is compared with outcomes in other Asian economies. How this experience relates to literature on
what is behind the Asian miracle is then considered.
Structural Transformation
For the past two decades Vietnam has experienced rapid GDP growth. Table 1 presents the
sectoral composition of GDP and employment in Vietnam for 2007, as well as sectoral growth
rates from 2000 to 2007 and 2007 to 2011 (GSO, 2014).2 This division was chosen to reﬂect
slowdowns in economic growth in Vietnam and elsewhere following the global recession (Abbott
and Tarp, 2012). State intervention in reaction to the great recession may have inﬂuenced
employment trends. Sectoral employment shares and sectoral employment growth rates are also
reported. The table clearly reﬂects a case of structural transformation at work. From 2000 to 2007
GDP grew at 7.5 per cent per year. Agriculture grew at 3.7 per cent, while manufacturing grew at
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11.2 per cent, construction at 10.4 per cent and various services at over 6.6 per cent per year. The
slower GDP growth from 2007 to 2011, at 5.9 per cent per year, brought greater reductions in
manufacturing (to 7.0 per cent) and construction growth (to 4.7 per cent) than for agriculture (to
3.3 per cent). From 2000 to 2007, employment in agriculture actually declined, while manufactur-
ing employment increased at 6.7 per cent and construction at 11.8 per cent. While slower GDP
growth after 2007 brought slower employment growth in manufacturing and especially construc-
tion, employment growth in lower-productivity agriculture and some service sectors increased, and
hence overall employment growth held roughly constant. Thus, problematic structural transforma-
tion appears to be a smaller issue after 2007 than before. Differences in value added versus
employment growth rates are noticeable for agriculture and manufacturing and in some services but
not elsewhere. Infrastructure services (transportation, communications, hotels and tourism, and
wholesale and retail trade) exhibit slower employment growth, whereas other services (professional
and public services) have shown rapid employment growth, especially after 2007.
Figure 1 compares labour productivity across sectors in Vietnam. It shows the typically large
differences in productivity levels, with manufacturing and construction yielding the highest
productivity rates, while productivity in agriculture is much lower. In addition to showing
sectoral differences, Figure 1 also demonstrates that productivity has been improving steadily in
most sectors in Vietnam, averaging 4.2 per cent per year from 2000 to 2011. In contrast
to a simplistic structural transformation story, agricultural productivity has been improving at
3.6 per cent per year. Manufacturing productivity also grew at 3.6 per cent per year. The faster
growth for overall productivity reﬂects in part sectoral share changes towards higher-productivity
activities, but may also capture capital-labour substitution or biased technical change.
Investment accounted for 34–42 per cent of Vietnam’s GDP in 2000–2011, but investment
efﬁciency is relatively low, suggested by high incremental capital-output ratios, especially after
2007 (GSO, 2014). In addition to lowering employment growth, capital-intensive development
may have contributed to sluggish restructuring of the economy from rural to urban areas, from
Table 1: GDP and employment in Vietnam
2007 2000–2007 2007–2011
Trillion Dong Share – % Growth – %/year
GDP 461 — 7.5 5.9
Agriculture 83 18 3.7 3.3
Manufacturing 113 25 11.2 7.0
Construction 43 9 10.4 4.7
Infrastructure services 106 23 7.1 7.4
Education & health 22 5 7.4 6.9
Energy & natural resources 38 8 6.2 4.2
Other services 57 12 6.6 6.0
Million Persons
Employment 45.2 — 2.6 2.7
Agriculture 23.9 53 −0.3 0.4
Manufacturing 5.7 13 6.7 5.2
Construction 2.4 5 11.8 7.7
Infrastructure services 7.4 16 3.5 5.7
Education & health 1.9 4 6.3 3.8
Energy & natural resources 0.4 1 3.1 −0.1
Other services 3.6 8 15.2 2.5
Source: GSO (2014).
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agriculture to manufacturing, and from public to private ﬁrms, resulting in slower than desired
labour migration out of sectors where productivity is low (MOLISA and ILO, 2010).
International Comparison
While Vietnam is in some ways unique, the above trend in labour demand relative to GDP
growth is found throughout East Asia. Table 2 compares several Asian countries. The
elasticity of labour demand (employment) growth due to GDP growth around 2006–2008
was 0.32 in Vietnam, while it was around 0.1 in faster-growing China. Values for Thailand
and South Korea are also lower than in Vietnam in recent years. Estimates very similar to those
for Vietnam are found in several other East Asian countries. This measure is used by the ILO
to reﬂect concerns similar to those voiced in Vietnam on employment generation (Kapsos,
2005), and is coupled with the concern that development may be overly capital intensive
throughout Asia.
Global trends in GDP and employment growth have inspired a recent literature on ‘premature
deindustrialization’ (Rodrik, 2015). The second step in structural transformation, following a ﬁrst
shift from agriculture to manufacturing, is the move from a manufacturing-based economy to greater
emphasis on services, where wages are often lower. The proponents of premature deindustrialization
see this happening sooner and at lower GDP per capita in East Asia and in recently developing
countries than was the case for the now developed economies. While Vietnam, given its sustained
manufacturing employment growth, is not at this point counted among the most problematic
cases, the pessimistic perspective among its proponents reﬂects concerns that this may be an issue
in the future.
Technical Change and the Asian Miracle
The role of technological progress during the course of Vietnam’s development in the past two
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LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY - VALUE ADDED PER WORKER
Figure 1: Sectoral labour productivity in Vietnam.
Source: GSO (2014).
Notes: Real value added per worker is measured in million dong (at 1994 prices) per year.
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factor productivity (TFP) growth only accounted for 26 per cent of GDP growth, whereas capital
accumulation contributed to more than 60 per cent of GDP growth. Previous studies such as
ILSSA (2008) also found low TFP growth rates.
The role of technological progress during the course of economic growth in East Asia is
controversial. Some economists (for example, Kim and Lau, 1994; Krugman, 1994; Young,
1995; Collins and Bosworth, 1996) maintain that East Asian growth is mainly because of
capital accumulation and that technological progress is unimportant. Others (for example,
World Bank, 1993; Pack and Page, 1994; Freeman, 1995; Rodrik, 1997; Nelson and Pack,
1999; Krüger et al, 2000) argue that technological progress, particularly labour-saving
technological change, fuelled the extraordinary economic growth that constituted the ‘Asian
miracle’. Moreover, Rodrik (1997) explicitly points out that the low TFP growth rates found in
most studies are problematic. They fail to incorporate biased technological progress in their
calculations.
Employment Growth Decomposition
We now turn to employment growth decomposition to quantitatively analyse the respective
contributions of biased technological change, structural transformation and institutional biases to
employment growth for each sector and for the overall Vietnamese economy. The decomposition
starts with a straightforward relationship that links employment, labour efﬁciency, sectoral output








where Lt is total employment at time t, which is the sum of sectoral employment Lit across the
i sectors. aLit denotes the unit labour efﬁciency coefﬁcient for sector i at time t, which is the ratio
between labour used in sector i and output in sector i. Sit is the proportion of output in sector i in
Table 2: Real GDP growth and employment growth in selected Asian countries, 1986–2008
Country 1986–1990 1991–1995 1996–2000 2001–2005 2006–2008
Gap between real GDP growth and employment growth (%)
China 5.7 11.0 7.5 8.6 10.5
Korea, Republic 6.4 5.6 3.4 3.4 3.5
Thailand 7.7 8.3 −0.4 3.4 3.1
Indonesia 4.6 5.5 −1.9 2.7 4.2
Philippines 2.0 −0.9 1.7 2.0 3.3
Vietnam 2.7 6.4 4.7 5.7 5.0
Elasticity of labour demand with respect to real GDPa
China 0.28 0.11 0.13 0.1 0.06
Korea, Republic 0.33 0.29 0.25 0.24 0.16
Thailand 0.25 0.04 1.58 0.33 0.25
Indonesia 0.35 0.30 2.91 0.42 0.30
Philippines 0.57 1.42 0.58 0.55 0.40
Vietnam 0.53 0.28 0.30 0.27 0.32
aThe elasticity of labour demand with respect to real GDP is calculated as the ratio between the percentage change in
employment and the percentage change in real GDP, measuring the responsiveness of employment to economic growth.
Source: Calculated using data from World Bank (2013).
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total output at time t, and Yt is the output (GDP) of the entire economy at time t. Differentiating





































gSit + gYt (3)
where aLt = Lt/Yt = ΣiaLitSit, the overall labour-output ratio for the economy.
Equation (3) incorporates the factors that may contribute to slower than desired employ-
ment growth as discussed earlier. Biased technical change affects employment by altering
input efﬁciency. Minimum wage policy may distort input-output ratios by altering relative
input prices, and therefore relative factor intensities. Thus, the ﬁrst term on the right-hand side
of equation (3) measures the combined contribution of two effects – capital-labour substitution
and technical change – both of which are incorporated in the changes in the labour-output
coefﬁcient (aLit). Structural transformation fundamentally inﬂuences sectoral output shares,
with traditional sectors shrinking and modern sectors expanding. State investment policies
direct resources to ﬂow into speciﬁc sectors, and hence may change sectoral output shares, Sit,
as well. The employment effects of both structural transformation and state investment
policies are summarized in the changes in sectoral output shares, gSit. Therefore, the second
term in equation (3) measures the contribution of structural transformation and state
investment bias to sectoral employment. If labour-output coefﬁcients, aLit, and output shares,
Sit, remain constant, one would observe the same growth rates for output and employment
(gLt=gYt). The ﬁrst two terms in equation (3) are weighted by relative sectoral labour
efﬁciency and sectoral output.
To implement our decomposition we assembled annual data from the GSO website (2014)
over the years 2000–2011 for both employment a (Lit) and sectoral output. The data were
originally disaggregated at an 18-sector level. Since structural transformation mainly focuses on
shifts between aggregate sectors, such as agriculture, manufacturing and services, we aggregated
the data into seven sectors, mainly eliminating details in the service sectors. Among the seven
economic sectors, there is an aggregate traditional sector (agriculture), a manufacturing sector, an
energy and natural resources sector, and four service sectors (including construction). The row
titled ‘GDP’ represents the overall economy.
The results of our employment growth decomposition analysis are presented in Table 3.
Growth rates for sectoral output shares (gSi), sectoral employment, gLi, and labour productivity
(labour – output ratios), gaLi, are reported for 2000–2007 and 2007–2011. The columns labelled
‘BiasTech’ are the contributions to labour employment growth because of improved labour
productivity, and hence the components of the ﬁrst term of equation (3). These may be because of
technical progress or minimum wage bias. The column labelled ‘StrCh’ is the contribution
because of sectoral share changes, and hence the components of the second term of equation (3).
These may be because of structural transformation or investment bias. Further analysis is required
to disentangle the contributions to employment growth from each potential explanation.
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From 2000 to 2007 employment growth is shown to be 4.8 per cent per year less than GDP
growth, with reductions in labour use (gaLi) contributing 3.01 per cent and sectoral share changes
1.78 per cent. Hence, biased technological change and/or institutional wage bias are responsible
for 63 per cent of the difference between GDP and employment growth, and structural
transformation and/or state investment bias are responsible for the remaining 37 per cent. From
2007 to 2011, the difference between GDP and employment growth was 3.2 per cent, with labour
productivity improvement contributing 2.24 per cent (70 per cent of this difference) and structural
shifts adding 0.96 per cent (30 per cent of the difference). These results suggest that structural
transformation explains at most about one-third of the growth rate differential.
The key sectors determining slower employment growth are agriculture, manufacturing,
infrastructure services and construction. Because of its size and low labour productivity,
changes in the traditional agricultural sector are the greatest factor in these calculations.
Agriculture’s sectoral output share fell at 3.7 per cent per year from 2000 to 2007, and labour
productivity improved at 4.1 per cent per year, resulting in employment growth rate reductions
of 2.2 and 2.4 per cent, respectively. From 2007 to 2011 these contributions were 1.34 and
1.42 per cent, once again with labour productivity improvements being a slightly greater factor
than the declining share of agricultural output. For manufacturing, in each period increases in
employment due to expanding sector shares are more than offset by improved labour
productivity. That improvement was much faster, at 4.6 per cent per year in the earlier period
than at 1.8 per cent in the latter period. For infrastructure services there is a mixed sectoral
share story but productivity improvements during each period, with output share increases
compensating for productivity improvement only in 2007–2011. Construction is the one
sector for which labour productivity declined, at 1.3 per cent per year from 2000 to 2007 and
2.9 per cent per year from 2007 to 2011. Its output share increase in 2000–2007 (3.0 per cent)
increased employment, but its output share decline from 2007 to 2011 (1.1 per cent) partially
offsets the increasing demand for labour in this sector. Energy and natural resources take a
large share of investment and output, mostly by state-owned enterprises, and that share is also
shrinking. At the same time, the very small employment share for this sector makes its
contribution to employment growth minimal. Other services, including professional and
various public services, show declining sector shares from 2000 to 2007, and improving labour
productivity after 2007.
Table 3: Employment growth decomposition
2000–2007 (%) 2007–2011 (%)
Sectors gSi gLi gaLi Bias
Tech
StrCh gY gSi gLi gaLi Bias
Tech
StrCh gY
Agriculture −3.7 −0.3 −4.1 −2.39 −2.20 — −2.6 0.4 −2.8 −1.42 −1.34 —
Manufacturing 3.8 6.7 −4.6 −0.50 0.41 — 1.1 5.2 −1.8 −0.24 0.15 —
Construction 3.0 11.8 1.3 0.05 0.11 — −1.1 7.7 2.9 0.17 −0.07 —
Infrastructure services −0.4 3.5 −3.6 −0.57 −0.06 — 1.5 5.7 −1.7 −0.30 0.26 —
Education & health −0.1 6.3 −1.1 −0.04 0.00 — 1.0 3.8 −3.1 −0.13 0.04 —
Energy & natural
resources
−1.2 3.1 −3.1 −0.03 −0.01 — −1.7 −0.1 −4.3 −0.04 −0.02 —
Other services −0.8 15.2 8.6 0.45 −0.04 — 0.1 2.5 −3.5 −0.27 0.01 —
GDP (overall
economy)
0.0 2.63 −4.8 −3.01 −1.78 7.5 0.0 2.7 −3.2 −2.24 −0.96 5.90
Source: Authors’ calculations from data in GSO (2014).
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Technological Change and Employment
One issue in interpreting the above employment and growth decomposition is to identify whether
increasing labour productivity is because of capital-labour substitution or due to technical change.
Moreover, technical change can be labour augmenting if productivity of labour grows faster than
productivity of capital. While previous studies generally assumed Hicks-neutral technological
change, critics of these studies point out that ignoring biased technological change may lead to
underestimation of TFP growth (for example, Rodrik, 1997).
Estimation of substitution elasticities and of changing factor productivity (biased technical
progress) is challenging because of the nature of the data used to estimate production functions.
Figure 2 shows labour and capital productivity from 2001 to 2011 for the overall Vietnamese
economy. It also shows real private wages, real interest rates and thus the wage-rental ratio over that
same period. While rising wages and steadily rising labour productivity are evident, ﬂuctuating real
interest rates led to an erratic wage-rental ratio that rose signiﬁcantly at the beginning of this period
and is confused by negative real interest rates at the time of the global recession. While capital
productivity was stagnant until 2008, it fell dramatically during and after the great recession, even
as the wage-rental ratio moved back to its pre-recession levels. If these volatile relative factor prices
are driving factor substitution, it is not evident in this data. More likely, long-run expectations of
rising real wages may have helped the Vietnam transition to more efﬁcient, albeit capital-intensive
technologies. Assuming constant technical progress better ﬁts this medium-term data, not only for
the overall economy, but for most disaggregated sectors as well.
Econometric estimation of production functions using this type of data often leads to estimated
elasticities of substitution not signiﬁcantly different from zero and signiﬁcantly different from
one. Disentangling the elasticity of substitution estimate from biased technical progress requires
an identifying assumption, typically a choice of functional form. We examine three alternatives in
the set of CES models – Cobb-Douglas, Leontief and a general CES speciﬁcation. In addition, it
has been recognized that investment and growth may be determined simultaneously, introducing
an identiﬁcation problem (Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003). Estimation of factor demand equations,
one of several approaches used to address these problems, may address that concern at least for
labour demand. Estimation of disaggregated sectoral factor demands also reduces the likelihood
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Figure 2: Factor prices, substitution and technical change in Vietnam.
Sources: GSO (2011, 2014); IMF (2013).
Notes: All variables are expressed as indices normalized to equal 1 in 2001.
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Previous studies often used an accounting approach to calculate TFP growth under a Cobb-
Douglas production function to avoid these same problems, and to identify TFP growth. In that
approach, actual input cost shares are employed to measure the parameters of the production
function. The broad results based on an accounting approach often seem reasonable, but they may
hide potential weaknesses associated with the assumptions of the Cobb-Douglas production
function. That production function is believed to be robust if similar results can be obtained from
both accounting and econometric approaches. Results from econometric estimation can also test
whether elasticities of substitution are indeed one, but must separately identify technical progress
and factor substitutions because of changes in the wage-rental ratio.
To circumvent potential problems associated with biased technological change and the
validity of the production functional forms assumed, the analyst can estimate productivity growth
rates in factor demand equations, allowing both Hicks-neutral and factor-augmenting technolo-
gical change, derived from Cobb-Douglas, CES and Leontief production functions, and using
both accounting and econometric approaches. In our case, we use sectoral data from GSO (2009,
2010) to estimate productivity growth rates for 18 aggregated sectors and for the overall economy
from 2000 to 2008. Detailed derivations and results are available in Abbott et al (2011). In this
article, we report key results in Table 4 and discuss the lessons learned.
Accounting approaches based on the Cobb-Douglas production function are clearly the most
common in the literature, and their application to the Vietnamese data leads to reasonable though
somewhat low estimates of Hicks-neutral technical change, similar to results found for other
Asian countries and by ILSSA (2008) for Vietnam. The econometric estimation of a Cobb-
Douglas production function gives vastly different results for parameters that should equal costs
Table 4: Estimated sectoral elasticities of substitution and technical progress
Sector Elasticities of
substitution
Technical progress (% per year
for labour efﬁciency improvement)
CES estimates Cobb-douglas CES estimates
Neutral Biased Accounting Estimated Neutral Biased Leontief
Agriculture −0.38 0.13* 5.4 7.6 82.0 7.0 5.7*
(−0.86) (3.34) — (1.2) — — (16.5)
Manufacturing 1.52* 0.87* 3.4 4.6 2.0 5.2 6.0*
(24.9) (2.35) — (1.5) — — (22.8)
Construction 0.28 0.69* 4.3 4.0 5.3 10.1 5.8*
(1.41) (10.70) — (1.9) — — (3.6)
Infrastructure services 0.4* 0.24 9.1 18.0 1.4 15.7 12.9*
Education & health 1.04* 0.71* 7.5 7.6 0.7 28.0 9.0*
Energy & natural resources 0.77* 0.86* −0.7 −0.4 −0.2 −2.7 0.6
GDP (overall economy) 1.54* 0.36* 4.1 2.8 4.5 10.4 5.8*
(2.31) (5.04) — (1.7) — — (27.6)
Source: Abbot et al (2011).
Notes: Estimates assuming Cobb-Douglas and CES production functions yield Hicks-neutral technical change. Biased
technical change estimates using CES and Leontief production functions yield separate labour and capital efﬁciency
improvements. Only labour results are presented here. For infrastructure services, education and health, and energy and
natural resources, estimates reported are averages over several more disaggregated subsectors. T-statistics are reported in
parentheses below estimates where applicable. Where averages are reported, for the accounting estimates, and for
technical progress in the CES cases where measures are derived, t-statistics cannot be easily estimated and thus are not
reported. Statistical signiﬁcance (at 1 per cent) is indicted by * where t-statistics can be computed and for the averages
when there are consistent results across all subsectors.
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shares, and in several cases these parameters are negative unless constrained at zero. The
estimates of technical progress are only somewhat different from accounting results. None of
these speciﬁcations predict factor use well over the sample period.
The assumption of a unitary elasticity of substitution must be relaxed to examine biased
technical change. Our attempts to apply a general CES production function provide evidence of
quite low elasticities of substitution, but results are not robust and some sectoral parameters are
found in implausible ranges – reﬂecting the data concerns noted above. Moreover, estimated
elasticities of substitution are much smaller when biased technical progress is taken into account,
as signiﬁcant labour-augmenting technical progress is then found and better explains output and
employment. Estimation using a Leontief production function, hence constraining the elasticity
of substitution to equal zero, provides the most robust results. Estimates of TFP growth are not
unreasonably large, but larger than found using the more standard approaches. For the overall
economy labour efﬁciency is found to grow at 5 per cent per year, while capital efﬁciency grows
at 1 per cent per year.3
In sum, comparisons of the predictive ability of alternative production functions and thus
derived conditional employment demand speciﬁcations conﬁrm the robustness of the Leontief
production function results, given data constraints. These results are consistent with signiﬁcant
labour-augmenting technical progress and better explain recent economic performance in
Vietnam. Hence, the most convincing interpretation of the labour demand growth decomposition
is based on the Leontief results that suggest that increasing labour productivity is because of
biased technical progress, not capital-labour substitution.
Institutional Biases and Employment
In Vietnam there are two policies that may have biased development towards a capital-intensive
path: minimum wage policy and state investment policy. In this section, we investigate to what
extent these two policies induce capital-intensive production, and how they in turn affect
employment in various key economic sectors.
Minimum Wage Policy
If minimum wage policy is not an important determinant of market wages, which rather follow
inﬂation and productivity trends, then the role of the minimum wage in employment over the
medium run is minimal. The literature on the magnitude and direction of these effects in Vietnam
and elsewhere is conﬂicting and unresolved (Cuong, 2010). There is also controversy over what
data is appropriate, with some emphasizing the use of only micro data. But both Cuong (2010)
and Sakellariou and Fang (2014), who look mostly at distributional implications over the longer
term, lack sufﬁcient variation in cross-sectional or panel household data (the VHLSS survey) to
identify signiﬁcant effects directly attributable to minimum wages. These studies also note that
the minimum wage is not always respected, not only by informal ﬁrms but also by some formal
ﬁrms. A long-run effect noted by McCaig and Pavcnik (2013) is that ﬁrms may be reluctant to
register as formal enterprises because of minimum wage laws. Yet this effect is muted if formal
ﬁrms are paying only a small share of workers at or below the minimum wage.
Here we focus on whether minimum wages distort capital-labour ratios. We ﬁrst explore
whether the minimum wage is seen as an important factor in setting overall market wages. Then
we consider to what extent the minimum wage would affect labour-output coefﬁcients and
employment, using the conditional employment demand functions discussed in the section
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‘Technological change and employment’. If elasticities of substitution are near zero (our earlier
result), even if minimum wages do drive overall wages, the effect on labour intensity and thus
employment is small.
Ideally, we would also compare minimum wages to wages of unskilled workers. Unfortu-
nately, available data does not allow such distinctions. If the minimum wage is binding, it is most
likely for only a small number of low-skill workers in a ﬁrm who represent only a fraction of the
workforce. The question we can address is whether available evidence supports the claim that
minimum wages inﬂuence the overall wage structure, and hence average wages.
Figure 3 compares wages for state-owned enterprises, foreign-invested enterprises and the
private (formal) sector to the minimum wage from 2001 to 2011. Two observations are apparent.
First, the minimum wage is much lower than actual average wages for any of these ﬁrm types.
After 2007 there were separate minimum wages for private ﬁrms and for foreign-invested ﬁrms.
Average wages for private formal ﬁrms were subsequently nearly four times the minimum wage
applicable to those ﬁrms, and wages in foreign-invested ﬁrms were nearly three times higher than
the much higher minimum wage required of those ﬁrms. While wages for informal ﬁrms and
traditional labour markets are lower, the minimum wage is seldom enforced in those cases.
The second observation is that changes in minimum wages often lag rather than lead wages
paid by the various ﬁrm types. Once set, minimum wages have often not been changed for more
than a year. From 2000 to 2011 the minimum wage was changed eight times, so that sometimes
the lag has been as long as 2 years. As seen in Figure 3, private wages have been steadily
increasing in both nominal and real terms, as both inﬂation and economic growth have fuelled
pressure for higher wages. For state-owned enterprises minimum wages have changed more
frequently since 2007, but have remained ﬂat in real terms, as have the levels of real state wages.
In private (formal and informal) and foreign-invested ﬁrms, however, real wages have increased
rapidly in periods when real minimum wages remained constant or fell.
To measure the link between minimum wages and actual nominal wages, we estimated





























Private wages Foreign invested firm wages SOE wages
for FDI in Region IMinimum wage
Figure 3: Real wages and the minimum wage in Vietnam.
Sources: GSO (2011, 2014); Wikipedia (2013); IMF (2013).
Notes: Real wages are monthly average income per employee per month in thousand dong (at 2005
prices).
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variables to explain variation in the nominal market wage. The goal of this regression is to
determine the importance of the real minimum wage and/or inﬂation in determining the overall
pattern and level of nominal market wages. We estimated this relationship separately for each
ﬁrm type and for each aggregated sector. Private (formal sector) wage data as well as wages for
foreign-invested ﬁrms came from the Enterprise survey (GSO, 2011). The GSO website (GSO,
2014) reports wage data for state-owned enterprises, from which more current data is available.
CPI values are from IMF (2013) and minimum wage data based on the Labour Law by the
National Assembly of Vietnam that are accessible online (Wikipedia, 2013).
Estimation results summarized in Table 5 indicate that for most sectors inﬂation is a
signiﬁcantly more important factor than the minimum wage in driving market wages. All of the
elasticities with respect to the real minimum wage are small and are statistically signiﬁcant in
only three of 12 cases. We also tried constraining the elasticity on inﬂation to one, that is, neutral
inﬂation pass-through for all the sectors. Then only ﬁve cases have a signiﬁcant (but low)
correlation between the real market wage and the real minimum wage. For the original model
(Table 5), two of the three sectoral cases where a signiﬁcant relationship was found were for state-
owned enterprises. The other case was private invested agricultural ﬁrms. For the economy
overall, coefﬁcients are insigniﬁcant for private and foreign-invested ﬁrms, while that for state-
owned ﬁrms is only signiﬁcant at the 5 per cent level. On the other hand, inﬂation is a highly
signiﬁcant factor determining nominal wages, at the 0.1 per cent level in 11 of 12 sectoral cases
and also overall (independent of ownership). Hence, this evidence suggests minimum wages have
had little inﬂuence on the evolution of market wages in Vietnam. If it had a small effect, it was on
state-owned ﬁrms and not private or foreign-invested ﬁrms. Moreover, since some sectoral
coefﬁcients on inﬂation differ from one, there appears to be some degree of non-neutrality in
inﬂation pass-through.
The second factor in the link between minimum wages and employment is the extent to which
higher wages would induce factor substitution towards more capital-intensive techniques. Our
estimates of elasticities of substitution yielded quite low, statistically insigniﬁcant values. Had
minimum wages signiﬁcantly increased market wages, then their effect on employment would




real min wage CPI real min wage CPI real min wage CPI
Agriculture 1.02* 1.99*** 2.01* −0.35 0.41 1.10***
−3.17 −8.91 −2.89 (−0.72) −1.53 −7.84
Manufacturing 0.34 1.43*** 0.16 1.46*** 0.3 0.89***
−2.25 −8.14 −1.02 −8.26 −2.25 −11.05
Construction 0.46* 1.27*** 0.43 1.50*** −0.064 1.54***
−2.61 −9.11 −1.42 −6.3 (−0.14) −7.56
Infrastructure services 0.21 2.13*** 0.037 1.72*** 0.03 1.05***
−1.36 −16.94 −0.36 −20.6 −0.25 −18.88
Overall – All sectors 0.59* 1.61*** 0.28 1.60*** 0.3 0.95***
−2.89 −9.39 −1.59 −10.8 −1.73 −11.71
Source: Wu (2012).
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are t statistics. * represents P<0.05, ** represents P<0.01 and *** represents P<0.001.
Dependent variable is the nominal sectoral wage.
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have been muted by these small elasticities. The combination of minimum wages exerting little
inﬂuence on overall market wages plus these very limited effects of wages on factor demand
patterns suggests that the recent evolution of minimum wages did not contribute in any signiﬁcant
way to more capital-intensive development. Thus, the improved labour productivity term in
equation (3) should be attributed to biased technical progress, not to this institutional bias.
State Investment
According to MOLISA and ILO (2010), investment in state-owned ﬁrms tends to be overly capital
intensive, and they could absorb more labour if that investment were less so, or if more investment
went to the private sector. In order to evaluate the role of state investment in recent employment
trends, two issues must be addressed. One is the extent to which state-owned enterprises are more
capital intensive than other ﬁrms. The second is the extent to which there has been restructuring,
resulting in either a smaller state sector or state enterprises concentrated in capital-intensive sectors.
This analysis is limited by the data available. The GSO (2014) website reports output, investment
and employment by either ﬁrm ownership type or sector. It does not provide tables that address both
these dimensions at once. This limits both capital intensity and restructuring information.
Figure 4 presents both labour and capital productivity by ﬁrm ownership. It is apparent that
private domestic ﬁrms use much less capital and much more labour per unit output (value added)
than either foreign-invested or state-owned ﬁrms. As of 2011, capital and labour intensities of
state-owned and foreign-invested ﬁrms were similar. Labour productivity in state-owned ﬁrms at
that time was six times higher than in domestic private ﬁrms, while capital productivity was less
than one half that for private ﬁrms. Both state-owned and foreign-invested enterprises clearly
chose more capital-intensive techniques than did domestic private ﬁrms.
These factor intensities suggest that investments by state-owned enterprises go counter to
Vietnam’s comparative advantage as a labour-abundant, low-wage country. This reﬂects that
these ﬁrms have had access to better, more capital-intensive international technologies than do
strictly private ﬁrms, especially as state-owned enterprises have in the past partnered with foreign
ﬁrms. Allocation of savings by a socialist government that favours state-owned enterprises has











































State Owned Foreign Invested
Private Overall
State Owned Foreign Invested
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LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY - 1/AL CAPITAL PRODUCTIVITY - 1/AK
Figure 4: Labour and capital productivity by ﬁrm ownership.
Source: GSO (2014).
Notes: Real value added per worker is measured in million dong (at 1994 prices) per year. Capital
productivity is value added per year in million dong per million dong invested.
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Factor intensities have changed over time because of both shifts in sectoral emphasis and
technical change. Foreign-invested ﬁrms were in 2001 much less labour intensive than even
state-owned ﬁrms. Since then they have invested in more labour-intensive sectors, and thus
employment intensity has increased. Capital intensity for foreign-invested ﬁrms initially
decreased as employment intensity increased, but there was a signiﬁcant decline in capital
productivity for all ownership types after 2007. While labour productivity has been steadily
increasing for all ﬁrm types over the entire period for state-owned and private ﬁrms, capital
productivity was declining, corresponding with labour-capital substitution or biased technical
change. The fall in capital productivity after 2007 was not matched by any change in the trend
for labour productivity. If there is an effect on employment trends due to capital-intensive
development, it appears to be found for all ﬁrm types, and the changing role of foreign-invested
ﬁrms is the most dramatic change.
Table 6 presents GDP, investment and employment by ﬁrm ownership in 2000, 2007 and
2011 to show the extent of restructuring by state-owned enterprises as well as the emergence of
foreign-invested ﬁrms. These data suggest very little restructuring, but reﬂect a state sector being
slowly overtaken by more dynamic private and foreign ﬁrms. The state share of GDP fell from
41 per cent in 2000 to 39 per cent in 2007 and 37 per cent in 2011. The decline in its share of
investment was much larger, from 59 per cent in 2000 to 40 per cent in 2011. Investment declines
greater than output declines reﬂect increasingly capital-intensive production and sectoral shifts,
as well as declining capital productivity, for all types of ﬁrms. The employment share of state-
owned enterprises changed very little over this period, at 3 per cent in both 2000 and 2011.
Table 6: Investment, output and employment by ﬁrm ownership
Overall Enterprises by ﬁrm ownership
State owned (SOE) Foreign invested (FDI) Private
2000
GDP 274 112 30 133
41% 11% 48%
Investment 115 68 21 26
59% 18% 23%
Employment 37.1 4.4 0.4 32.4
12% 1% 87%
2007
GDP 461 180 61 220
39% 13% 48%
Investment 309 132 85 93
43% 27% 30%
Employment 45.2 5.0 1.6 38.7
11% 3% 86%
2011
GDP 584 213 80 291
37% 14% 50%
Investment 363 145 95 122
40% 26% 34%
Employment 50.4 5.3 1.7 43.4
10% 3% 86%
Source: GSO (2014).
Notes: GDP and investment are in trillion dong. Employment is in million persons. Shares are reported in per cent below
each variable.
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With this small change in employment shares, state enterprises play a very limited role in our
employment growth decomposition. Had there been much more restructuring, the differences in
capital and labour intensity would have mattered more. Possibly more notable are the changes for
foreign-invested ﬁrms. Their investment share increased from 18 per cent in 2000 to 26 per cent
in 2011 following the surge in foreign investment around WTO accession in 2008. The
investment share of private domestic ﬁrms increased faster than for either state or foreign ﬁrms,
from 23 per cent in 2000 to 34 per cent in 2011. The employment share of foreign ﬁrms jumped
from 1 per cent in 2000 to 3 per cent in 2007 and 2011. Their output share increased somewhat
from 11 per cent in 2000 to 14 per cent in 2011. The small share changes are all because of the
dynamic growth of private ﬁrms that makes changes in state and foreign ﬁrms relatively smaller.
Sector composition matters to capital intensity and to the scope for restructuring. State-owned
enterprises have been heavily involved in capital-intensive mining, natural resources and energy
sectors, although they operate in many other, potentially more labour-intensive sectors as well.
Foreign ﬁrms have also exhibited some signiﬁcant sectoral shifts since 2000. Revised investment
and enterprise laws in the mid-2000s, as part of pre-WTO accession changes, allowed wholly
owned foreign-invested ﬁrms that are no longer required to partner with SOEs to alter their
sectoral composition. This led to an increase in the share of foreign ﬁrms in manufacturing.
Consequently, the state’s share in manufacturing declined.
Older data are available by sector and ﬁrm ownership for investment (but not output) (GSO,
2009), allowing us some idea of what sectoral shifts have been occurring as shown in Table 7.3
This table shows the large decline in the overall investment share of state-owned enterprises, but
not dramatic changes in the sectoral composition of that investment allocation. The agriculture
share dropped the most while construction increased, and there is a decline in the share of the
energy and natural resource sectors matched by an increase for foreign ﬁrms, similar to that for
manufacturing. This does not provide a consistent story about SOE movements into or out of
capital-intensive sectors, as some expanding sectors were capital intensive while others are labour
intensive. Moreover, movement of investment out of agriculture has only limited structural
transformation effects, as it was for processing and distribution ﬁrms, not primary production
where most low-wage employment is found.
These results suggest that restructuring and investment allocation into the private ﬁrms, which
are relatively less capital intensive, could be an important factor driving future employment
growth. If state ﬁrms had been expanding in output shares, then the employment growth rates in
Table 7: Sectoral investment shares by ﬁrm ownership
Sector Firm ownership (%)
State owned (SOE) Foreign invested (FDI) Private
2000 2007 2000 2007 2000 2007
Agriculture 4.6 2 3.4 2.4 4.8 4
Manufacturing 4.8 3.2 6.8 9.3 3.1 3.4
Construction 1.4 1.8 0.5 0.3 0.5 1.3
Infrastructure services 12.7 8.7 0.9 2 1 5.4
Education & health 9.3 6.9 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.9
Energy & natural resources 16.2 9.3 1 8.2 0.5 1.8
Other services 10.1 8 4.8 2.1 12.3 12.6
GDP (overall economy) 59.1 39.9 18 24.8 22.9 29.5
Source: GSO (2009).
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those modern sectors would be lower because of relatively low labour requirements in state
enterprises. This story is probably more relevant to the 1990s than to the 2000s, however. The
slowly declining importance of state production in key modern sectors weakens the impact of an
overly capital-intensive production strategy pursued by state ﬁrms on slowing down employment
growth for the entire economy. The low state employment share, stagnant output share and
limited restructuring mean these sectoral ownership effects are a small part of our employment
growth decomposition. At the same time, it may be the case that restructuring could occur more
rapidly in the future, making the gap between GDP and employment growth smaller as private
ﬁrms expand more rapidly.
Conclusions
Employment in Vietnam has grown more slowly than GDP over the last two decades. While this
difference reﬂects improvements in labour productivity and rising GDP per capita – signs of
successful development – it has also raised concerns among Vietnamese policymakers that
economic development is not creating enough new jobs. Structural transformation has moved
labour from lower-productivity traditional sectors, especially agriculture, to higher-productivity
modern sectors including manufacturing and services. The Vietnamese labour ministry in its
assessment of the labour situation in Vietnam (MOLISA and ILO, 2010) believes this
restructuring is not moving sufﬁciently rapidly, has involved too little innovation, and exhibits
an overly capital-intensive development strategy.
We used data for seven aggregate sectors and the overall Vietnamese economy from 2000
to 2007, and then to 2011, provided by GSO (2014), to examine the roles played by structural
transformation, technical progress and institutional bias towards capital-intensive develop-
ment to explain the differences observed between employment and GDP growth. This
decomposition attributes only about one-third of the employment-growth difference to shifts
from low-productivity to higher-productivity sectors. The remaining two-thirds came from
declining labour use per unit output that is also found in agriculture. Further analysis
attempted to separate technical progress and structural transformation from institutional biases
towards capital-intensive development.
Data on capital- and labour-output ratios reveal steadily improving labour productivity, but
erratic and inconsistent factor price trends. Estimated elasticities of substitution are generally
signiﬁcantly less than one, and not signiﬁcantly greater than zero, regardless of speciﬁcation.
Estimation using a Leontief production function shows that TFP growth is not unreasonably
large, and larger than found using the more standard approaches relied on in MOLISA and ILO
(2010). For the overall economy, our results suggest that labour efﬁciency grew at 4.2 per cent
per year, while capital efﬁciency grew at 1 per cent per year. These results are consistent with
signiﬁcant labour-augmenting technical progress and better explain historical economic perfor-
mance in Vietnam. This is highly consistent with the Rodrik (1997) conjecture that there may
have been signiﬁcant technical progress behind the Asian miracle, and that the analyst must
address a labour-augmenting bias in technical change to ﬁnd it.
Our results also suggested that rising minimum wages only contribute to a very limited extent
to more capital-intensive development. We looked at both of the two key links between the
minimum wage and labour intensity – the effect of minimum wages on overall wages and the
effect of wages on technical choices. Real market wages have been rising for private formal and
foreign ﬁrms as real minimum wages held constant since 2007. We found that non-neutral
inﬂation pass-through better explains nominal wage evolution than do minimum wages.
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Therefore, the differential between GDP and employment growth because of falling labour-
output ratios is mostly because of technical progress. Undoubtedly, long-run expectations on
relative wages have played a role in sectoral and technical choices made in Vietnam. Yet, over the
short run institutional biases in wage setting are only a limited factor.
Investment by state-owned enterprises appears to be much more capital intensive than for
private ﬁrms. While substantial investment in SOEs has persisted, low capital productivity since
2007, low labour output ratios and much more rapid growth of private ﬁrms mean that this factor
has only played a limited role in recent Vietnamese employment trends. This is best viewed as a
missed opportunity. Since there was little restructuring, there is little evident impact on
employment. More rapid restructuring and greater investment allocations to private ﬁrms and
less to SOEs would likely lead to greater demand for labour.
Structural transformation only partially explains the employment growth seen in Vietnam.
While some of the difference from GDP growth may, as just noted, be attributed to capital-
intensive investment by the state, a signiﬁcant share of the employment-growth difference is
because of technical change when low elasticities of substitution and labour-augmenting bias in
technical change are taken into account. In sum, there is little reason to be pessimistic about
the performance of the Vietnamese economy. Focus in the coming years should be on
consolidating the distinct progress made rather than on promoting policy shifts based on
inadequate interpretation of the available evidence.
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Notes
1. We will use the terminology ‘labour-augmenting technical change’, corresponding with the notion that
efﬁciency of the labour input is increasing. ‘Labour-saving’ is ambiguous, since an improvement in
capital efﬁciency could reduce labour demand, but only if the elasticity of substitution exceeds one.
2. Though no distinction is indicated on the GSO (2014) website, data for employment clearly include
informal labour given the large reported size of the agricultural sector, and the numbers reported for
manufacturing, construction and infrastructure services relative to numbers from the Enterprise survey
(GSO, 2011) that looks only at formal ﬁrms. When we look at wage data from that survey later, that
information is for formal ﬁrms, and will be so noted.
3. Detailed sector data provided by GSO (2009) are not entirely consistent with the aggregate data on its
website, with the largest differences in deﬂated capital allocations. Hence, the aggregate data shows
slower labour productivity growth and declining capital productivity. Gross output rather than value
added was also used in these estimations, and thus productivity differences may also reﬂect differences
in intermediate input efﬁciency.
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